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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Affirmative action, which is defined as "the notion that the 
government may utilize race and gender conscious programs to redress 
the continuing effects of past discrimination in this country," 1 is a hot 
topic in American higher education. The current affirmative action 
controversy revolves around universities' use of race in their admissions 
programs. 2 While supporters of affirmative action admissions programs 
argue that affirmative action policies are designed to ensure diversity, 
and thereby benefit all students, critics counter that such policies 
unconstitutionally discriminate against white students. In 2003, the 
United States Supreme Court considered both of these arguments in 
Gratz v. Bollinger3 and Grutter v. Bollinger,' in which applicants to the 
UnivPrsity of Michigan challenged the university's use of race in its 
undergraduate and law school admissions programs. The opinions from 
these two cases help to clarify how much weight, if any, colleges and 
universities can give to a student's race, color, or ethnic background in 
their admissions process. 
American universities want to do more than merely provide their 
students with an opportunity to master subjects or acquire skills. They 
want their students to achieve a higher level of education that comes 
from learning in an environment where "students come from very 
different places, and with widely different notions ... , [with] much to 
generalize, much to adjust, much to eliminate, [and] there are inter-
relations to be defined .... "5 Affirmative action admissions programs 
are designed to achieve this higher level of education by attempting to 
ensure that college classrooms are composed of students from diverse 
backgrounds. While it is widely accepted that affirmative action 
I. Carla D. Pratt, In the Wake of Hopwood: An Update on Affirmative Action in the 
Education Arena, 42 How. L). 451,451 (Spring 1999). 
2. Mark R. Fletcher, A Talc o( Two Cases: Grutter, Gratz, and the Constitutional Limits of 
Ajjirmative Action in Higher Education, 2002 L. Rev. M.S.ll.-D.C.L 965 (Winter 2002). 
3. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003). 
4. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). 
5. John Henry Newman, The Idea of a University, 130 (I.T. Ker ed., 1976). 
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admissions programs help minority students by giving certain racial and 
ethnic groups a boost in the admissions process, this comment explores 
the issue of whether affirmative action programs also benefit non-
minority students. 
Part II of this comment sets the stage for the current affirmative 
action debate by describing the constitutional and statutory grounds on 
which non-minority students have challenged affirmative action 
admissions programs. Part II also describes a key U. S. Supreme Court 
decision, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,6 and its 
Supreme Court and federal circuit court progeny. Part II concludes with 
an analysis of Gratz and Grutter. Part III evaluates empirical data from 
three recent studies to show that the use of affirmative action policies in 
college admissions benefits both non-minority and minority students by 
creating diversity on American campuses. Part IV considers affirmative 
action alternatives that some states have used in the face of judicial 
scrutiny. Finally, Part V addresses how affirmative action programs 
benefit non-minority students because they create a diverse learning 
environment where minority and non-minority students come together 
to learn, exchange ideas, understand each other, and form opinions that 
they will carry with them after they leave college. 
II. A PFIRMATIVE ACTION BACKGROUND 
A. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions 
Opponents to affirmative action have challenged the use of race in 
college admissions programs on the following grounds: ( 1) it violates the 
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ("Equal 
Protection Clause"f which guarantees a citizen's right to the equal use of 
public facilities without discrimination based on race; (2) it violates 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981 ")x which ensures that all persons within the 
6. Regents of U. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 ( 197S) (hereinafter Bakke). 
7. See U.S. Con st. amend. XIV,§ I. Section one of the fourteenth Amendment reads: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the· privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
8. See42 U.S.C:. § 1981(a) (2003). Section 1981 reads: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State 
and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full 
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is 
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall he subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, 
licenses, and exact ions of every kind, and to no other. 
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U.S. will enjoy the same rights as are "enjoyed by white citizens;" (3) it 
violates 42 U .S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983")9 which creates a civil action 
against any person who deprives an individual of their civil rights under 
color of state law; and ( 4) it violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 ("Title VI") 10 which prohibits race based discrimination by any 
organization receiving federal funds. 11 
Together, these constitutional and statutory provisions prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin, but do not 
address preferential treatment on the same grounds. 12 Consequently, the 
constitutionality of affirmative action programs, has been left entirely to 
the courts. 13 
B. Case Law 
1. Prior Supreme Court Rulings 
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 14 the seminal 
university admissions affirmative action case, the United States Supreme 
Court considered whether the special admissions program used by the 
Medical School of the University of California at Davis ("Davis"), which 
allocated 16 out of 100 seats in each year's class to members of certain 
minority groups, 15 violated the California Constitution, Title VI, and the 
Equal Protection Clause. 1" The Supreme Court, without producing a 
majority opinion, found that a public university could give some 
consideration to race in its admissions process without violating the 
Equal Protection Clause or Title Vl. 17 The Court also agreed with the 
9. Sec 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003). Section 1983 reads: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights. privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except 
that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's 
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated 
or declaratory relief was unavailable .. 
10. Sec 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2003). This section, also known as Title VI, reads: 
l\:o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 
II. Sec e.g. Fletcher, supra n. 2 at 968. 
12. Sec id. at 969. 
13. Sec id. 
14. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265. 
15. Id. at 265-66. 
16. Id. at 270. 
17. Id. at 265. 
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California Supreme Court that Davis' use of a racial quota in its 
admissions program was unconstitutional because it was not narrowly 
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. 
The problem with the five-to-four Bakke decision is that the nine 
Justices disagreed on the complex issues presented by the case and, 
consequently, no majority emerged to set guidelines for a permissible use 
of racial preferences in college admissions. tx Justice Powell, writing for 
the Court, included in his opinion that although Davis' race-based quota 
system was unconstitutional, achieving a diverse student body is a 
sufficiently compelling interest to justify the consideration of an 
applicant's race in the admissions process. Specifically, Justice Powell 
wrote that race can be used as a "plus" factor in admissions as long as there 
is a compelling state interest to do so, 19 and that the goal of a diverse 
student body constituted a compelling state interest.20 However, no other 
Justice expressly endorsed Powell's so called "diversity rationale."2 ' 
In the wake of Bakke, the Supreme Court reiterated their holding 
from Bakke that a strict scrutiny standard be applied to affirmative action 
cases.22 However, the Court was hesitant to clearly define what satisfied 
the compelling governmental interest prong of the strict scrutiny test. 
Given the Court's failure to clarify its position on Justice Powell's 
"diversity rationale," lower courts did their best to answer the question 
on their own. 
2. Case Law from Federal Circuit Courts 
Because of Bakke's failure to produce a majority opinion and the 
apparent lack of support from other Justices for Justice Powell's 
"diversity rationale," until the Supreme Court resolved the question in 
Grutter and Gratz, lower federal circuit courts disagreed over the 
question of whether the goal of obtaining a diverse student body satisfies 
the "compelling governmental interest" prong of the strict scrutiny test. 
For example, in Hopwood v. State ofTexas,23 a white student who was 
denied admission to the University of Texas School of Law brought suit 
18. Id. at 320. 
19. Id. at 318. 
20. Id. at 311-12. 
21. Id. at 328-421. 
22. The strict scrutiny test consists of the following two prongs: (I) "any racial classification 
'must be justified by a compelling governmental interest'" Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 
267, 274 (1986) (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,432 (1984)); and (2) "the means chosen by 
the State to effectuate its purpose must be 'narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal."' 
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S 448, 480 ( 1980)). 
23. Hopwood v. St. of Tex., 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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alleging that the school's admissions program, which considered the race 
of applicants to ensure campus diversity, violated the Equal Protection 
Clause and Title VU4 The Fifth Circuit struck down Texas' admissions 
program in its in entirety because: (1) Justice Powell's "diversity 
rationale" in Bakke was merely the opinion of one Justice and, therefore, 
"not binding precedent on the issue[;]"25 and (2) there was no evidence 
that the law school discriminated in the past.26 The Supreme Court 
subsequently denied certiorari because the challenged admissions 
program no longer existed.27 
A few years later in Smith v. University of Washington Law Schoo/,28 
several students brought suit against the law school alleging that its 
affirmative action admissions program, which ensured diversity, violated 
Sections 1981 and 1983, and Title VU9 In Smith, the Ninth Circuit 
recognized that although no other Justice explicitly agreed with Powell's 
opmwn, "educational diversity is [nonetheless] a compelling 
governmental interest that meets the demands of strict scrutiny .... "30 
To reach this conclusion, the court analyzed each of the concurring 
opinions in Bakke and determined that Justice Powell's analysis was the 
narrowest footing upon which a race conscious admissions program 
could stand. It then applied the Marks v. United States 31 analysis, which 
requires that "the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position 
taken by those Members who concurred in judgments on the narrowest 
grounds[,]" to conclude that the rationale that Powell used in Bakke 
represented the binding holding of the Court at the time.32 The Ninth 
Circuit then wrote that because the Supreme Court had not returned to 
the question of the use of race in college admissions and had not 
indicated that Powell's approach had lost its validity in this area, Justice 
Powell's "diversity rationale" was a compelling state interest. 33 The 
Supreme Court denied certiorari without opinion in this case.34 
24. I d. at 938. 
25. I d. at 944. 
26. Id. 
27. Tex. v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033, 1034 (1996). 
28. Smith v. U. of Wash. L. Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000). 
29. Jd.at119l. 
30. I d. at 1200-0 I. 
31. Marks v. U.S., 430 U.S. 188, 193 ( 1977) (recognizing that "the holding of the Court may be 
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds"-which turns out to be justice Powell's opinion) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
169 n. 15 (1976)). 
32. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1199. 
33. Jd. at 1200-0l. 
34. Smith v. U. of Wash. Law Sch., 532 U.S. 1051 (2001). 
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One year after Smith, in Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University 
of Georgia,35 undergraduate students brought suit alleging that a racial 
preference policy implemented by the University of Georgia in its 
freshman admissions program "to foster student body diversity[,]" 16 was 
unconstitutional. The Eleventh Circuit held that even if Justice Powell's 
opinion in Bakke was binding precedent, the University of Georgia's 
admissions program still failed to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard and 
was, therefore, unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored to 
serve the compelling interest of fostering student body diversity. 37 The 
University of Georgia decided not to appeal the decision to the Supreme 
Court. 
3. The Michigan Cases 
The epitome of the Bakke split is found in two cases brought by non-
minority applicants against the University of Michigan, which exemplify 
conflicting points of view surrounding Justice Powell's 
suggestion/holding that the goal of campus diversity is a compelling state 
interest. In these two cases, Gratz v. Bollinger3H and Grutter v. Bollinger,N 
applicants to the university's undergraduate and law schools, 
respectively, attempted "to determine the validity of racial classifications 
in admissions programs at the same university. However, the holdings of 
these two cases are very different: the Eastern District Court of Michigan 
found one policy constitutional and found the other, similar program, 
unconstitutional."40 
a. Gratz v. Bollinger41 
In Gratz, non-minority applicants brought suit against the University 
of Michigan's undergraduate College of Literature, Science, and Arts 
("LSA") alleging that it violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI 
by utilizing a race conscious affirmative action program in admissions. 42 
Looking to Bakke, the district court applied the strict scrutiny standard,u 
and determined that the goal of creating a diverse student body was "a 
35. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the U. of Ga., 263 F .3d 1234 (lith Cir. 200 I). 
36. Id. at 1239. 
37. !d. at 1245. 
38. Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E. D. Mich. 2000). 
39. Grutterv. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
40. Kathryne Raines, Student Author, The Diversity and Remedial Interests in University 
Admissions Programs, 91 Ky. L.j. 255,270 (2002/2003). 
41. Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 811. 
42. ld. at 813-14. 
43. !d. at 816 (quoting Ada rand Constr. Inc. v. Pen a, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (I 995) ). 
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compelling governmental interest in the context of higher education 
justifying the use of race as one factor in the admissions process."44 The 
district court also distinguished the LSA admissions program from the 
admissions program at issue in Bakke in that the LSA program did not 
employ a rigid quota system, which Justice Powell had found to be 
impermissible in Bakke.45 The court ultimately found that the LSA 
admissions policy satisfied the Bakke requirements and was, therefore, 
constitutional.46 
b. Grutter v. Bollinger47 
In Grutter, non-minority applicants brought suit against the 
University of Michigan Law School alleging that it violated the Equal 
Protection Clause, Title VI, and Section 1981 by using race as the 
prevailing factor in its admissions process.48 The applicants argued that 
the use of race gave preferred minority applicants a much greater chance 
of being admitted than non-minority and non-preferred minority 
applicants with similar qualifications and, thus, violated the 
Constitution.N On the other hand, the law school argued that "[b ]y 
enrolling a critical mass of [underrepresented] minority students, the 
Law School seeks to ensure their ability to make unique contributions to 
the character of the Law School."50 The law school defined "critical 
mass" as "meaningful numbers, or meaning representation" or, more 
specifically, as "numbers such that underrepresented minority students 
do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race."51 
In stark contrast to the district court's decision in Gratz, the Grutter 
district court elected not to follow Justice Powell's decision in Bakke when 
it held that a diverse student body in the University of Michigan's Law 
School is not a compelling governmental interest.52 "As in Hopwood, the 
Grutter [district] court believed that, due to the fragmented Bakke court, 
the Bakke opinion 'did not hold that a state educational institution's desire 
to assemble a racially diverse student body is a compelling government 
44. Gratz, 122 1'. Supp. 2d at 820 n. 9 ("Recognizing that neither the Supreme Court nor the 
Sixth Circuit have definitively held that diversity can never be a compelling interest under strict 
scrutiny, this Court is satisfied that the University's [diversity rationale] argument remains viable."). 
45. /d. at 827. 
46. !d. at 831. 
47. Gruffer, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 821. 
4X. !d. at 824. 
49. !d. 
50. Gruttcr, 123 S. Ct. at 2332 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
51. !d. at 2334-35. 
52. Gruffer, 137 F. Supp. at 844. 
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interest'."53 Consequently, the Grutter district court granted plaintiffs 
request for declaratory relief and enjoined the law school from using race 
as a factor in its admissions decisions. 54 
c. Grutter and Gratz at the Sixth Circuit 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit heard oral arguments for Grutter and 
Gratz simultaneously and delivered its decision on Grutter in the spring 
of 2002.55 The Sixth Circuit elected to answer the Gratz appeal at a later 
date. Sitting en bane, the Sixth Circuit "reject[ed] the district court's 
conclusion and [found] that the Law School [had] a compelling interest 
in achieving a diverse student body"56 because (1) it considered Justice 
Powell's opinion in Bakke as "binding on this court under Marks, 57 and 
because Bakke remains the law until the Supreme Court instructs 
otherwise[;]"58 and (2) it found that "the Law School's use of race was 
narrowly tailored because race was merely a potential plus factor .... "59 
d. Grutter and Gratz at the United States Supreme Court 
On December 2, 2002, the U. S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
hear Grutter and Gratz, "to resolve the disagreement among the Courts 
of Appeals on a question of national importance-whether diversity is a 
compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race in 
selecting applicants for admission to public universities."60 Note that the 
Supreme Court's decision to "consider the undergraduate case, Gratz v. 
Bollinger, was highly unusual because the Sixth Circuit [had] yet to rule 
on the lawsuit."61 
On June 23, 2003, the Supreme Court delivered decisions on the 
issues identified in Grutter62 and Gratz.63 In Grutter, Justice O'Connor, 
writing for a five to four majority, "endorse[ d] Justice Powell's view that 
53. Raines, 91 Ky. L.). at 273 (italics added) (quoting Bakke, 137 f. Supp. 2d at 844). 
54. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 872. 
55. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002). 
56. !d. at 739. 
57. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193. 
58. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 739. 
59. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2335 (citing Grutter, 288 F.3d at 746-49) (quotation marks omitted). 
60. !d. (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002)(granting certiorari)). 
61. Peter Schmidt & jeffrey Selin go, A Supreme Court Showdown, 49 Chron. of Higher Educ. 
A20 (Dec. 13, 2002). "The Supreme Court's rules provide that the [)justices may hear a dispute 
before a circuit-court ruling 'only upon a showing that the case is of such imperative public 
importance as to justify the deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate 
settlement in this court."' !d. at A26 (quoting28 U.S.C. § 210l(c) (2003)). 
62. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2325. 
63. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2411. 
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student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the 
use of race in university admissions,"64 and consequently, held that the 
law school has a compelling interest in attaining a critical mass of 
underrepresented students, which "is necessary to further its compelling 
interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body."65 
Justice O'Connor adopted the law school's "critical mass" standard as a 
constitutional use of affirmative action in the admission of underrepresented 
minority students because "critical mass is defined by reference to the 
educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce," not by reference 
to the enrollment of "some specified percentage of a particular group merely 
because of its race or ethnic origin ... [which] would amount to outright 
racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional."66 Additionally, Justice 
O'Connor wrote that since the law school "engages in a highly 
individualized, holistic view of each applicant's file, giving serious 
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse 
educational environment,"67 the law school properly uses race as a "plus" 
factor, and the law school sufficiently considers workable race-neutral 
alternatives. In conclusion, the Court held that "the Equal Protection 
Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in 
admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the 
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body."68 
In Gratz, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a six to three majority, 
ruled against Michigan's undergraduate admission's policy, but only 
because "the University's policy, which automatically distributes 20 
points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every 
single 'underrepresented minority' applicant solely because of race, is not 
narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity that 
respondents claim justifies their program."69 
The Grutter and Gratz decisions implicitly give more power to 
Justice Powell's "diversity rationale" but do not resolve all of the 
confusion generated by Bakke. As a result, a commentator recently 
alleged that "[t]he U.S. Supreme Court hardly ended the debate over 
race-conscious college admissions policies,"70 and "these issues will have 
64. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337. 
65. !d. at 2341. 
66. !d. at 2339 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
67. !d. at 2343. 
68. Id. at 2347. 
69. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2427-28. 
70. Peter Schmidt, Affirmative Action Survives, and So Does the Debate, 49 Chron. of Higher 
Educ. Sl (July 4, 2003). 
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to be fought out school by school and state by state."71 
Furthermore, in Grutter, Justice O'Connor wrote that "[a] core 
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all 
governmentally imposed discrimination based on race ... [a]ccordingly, 
race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time."72 As a 
result, Justice O'Connor wrote: 
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to 
further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public 
higher education. Since that time, the number of minority applicants 
with high grades and test scores has indeed increased. We expect that 
25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be 
necessary to further the interest approved today.73 
Consequently, affirmative action programs in university admissions 
have not escaped the strict scrutiny standard and, over time, race 
conscious admissions programs will likely be struck down. However, the 
"diversity rationale" presented by Justice Powell in Bakke and approved 
by the Supreme Court in Grutter and Gratz must endure the test of time 
if universities want to create, or maintain, a learning environment where 
minority and non-minority students come together to learn, exchange 
ideas, understand each other, and form opinions that they will carry with 
them after they leave college. Ensuing debates over affirmative action 
programs in university admissions will undoubtedly include discussions 
about the beneficiaries of affirmative action programs and empirical 
evidence regarding the claim that both minority and non-minority 
students benefit from affirmative action policies. Therefore, this 
comment includes an analysis of affirmative action beneficiaries. 
III. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BENEFICIARIES 
Kristy Downing, a female African-American law student, is 
considered by many to be the face of affirmative action at the University 
of Michigan. 74 While she realizes that many of her peers see her as just 
another beneficiary of an affirmative action quota system, Downing 
maintains that: "[p]eople who didn't want African-Americans to succeed 
in the first place will always see me as just an African-American. There's 
nothing I can do to please them except feel bad about myself. It's not 
71. Id. (quoting Roger B. Clegg, general counsel for the Center for Equal Opportunity, which 
is a group that opposes race-conscious admissions policies). 
72. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346 (citations omitted). 
73. Id. at 2346-47 (citations omitted). 
74. Richard Morgan, At Michigan, Beneficiary of Affirmative Action Is Proud to Dc(cnd It, 49 
Chron. of Higher Educ. A22 (Dec. 13, 2002). 
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that they're racist-they just don't speak from a perspective that includes 
other viewpoints."75 Downing's presence in the classroom and the 
opinions that she expresses from the perspective of an African-American 
woman are precisely why increased racial and ethnic diversity enhance 
the university learning experience to the benefit of both minority and 
non-minority students. 
Notwithstanding, judges have become increasingly skeptical about 
the theoretical benefits of diversity in higher education. 76 To counter 
this, universities have been forced to produce strong empirical evidence 
that "demonstrates the positive educational value of diversity."77 For this 
reason, the following three objective studies are discussed to support the 
argument that both minority and non-minority students are beneficiaries 
of diverse learning environments.n 
A. The Bok and Bowen Stud/Y 
The first of these studies, compiled by Derek Bok and William 
Bowen/0 considered and analyzed the experiences of tens of thousands of 
minority and non-minority students who entered twenty-eight of the 
nation's most prestigious universities in the fall of 1951, 1976, and 1989.x1 
According to the study's preface, Bok and Bowen set out to provide 
"empirical evidence as to the effects of [race-sensitive admissions] 
policies and their consequences for the students involved."R2 
The study asked students questions about the admissions process, 
their experience of studying on a diverse campus, their overall college 
experience, and their post-college family and social experiences. After 
analyzing the responses, Bok and Bowen made the following 
observations: First, "[o]f the blacks who entered selective colleges in 
1989, 88 percent report[ed] having known well two or more white 
classmates, while 56 percent of their white classmates say that they knew 
at least two black classmates well."R3 Second, as a rule, students who had 
extensive interaction with a diverse student body tended to maintain 
75. /d. (emphasis added). 
76. See Mark. R. Killenbeck, Pushing Things Up to Their First Principles: Reflections on the 
\!ulues ofA}{irmutivc Action, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 1299, 1333 (Dec. 1999). 
77. Td. 
78. !d. at 1326. 
79. See id. (citing Derek Bok & William <;. Bowen, The Shape of the River: Long- Term 
Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions (Princeton U. Press 1998)). 
80. Killenbeck, supra n. 76 at 1326. 
H l. See id.; See Derek Bok & William C. Bowen, Access to Success, 85 ABA). 62 ( 1999). 
82. Killen beck, supra n. 76 at 1326 (quoting Rok, 85 ABA). at xxiv). 
83. Bok, supra n. 81 at 63. 
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similar interactions with diverse groups after college as well.x4 Third, 
regarding post-college family and social experiences, white graduates of 
the selected institutions achieved meaningful employment, high 
earnings, considerable job satisfaction, and high levels of civic 
participation and satisfaction with life.x5 Fourth, "[a]lmost 80% of white 
graduates favor[ ed] retaining their school's current emphasis on diversity 
or emphasizing it even more."R6 
B. The Gurin Stud/7 
The second study, compiled' by Professor Patricia Gurin of the 
University of Michigan, was conducted as part of the University's efforts 
to defend its admissions policies in the Grutter and Gratz litigation and 
to the general public.xx 
Using national and Michigan databases, the Gurin study, which is 
alleged to be one of the most comprehensive empirical analyses ever 
performed,H9 provides empirical evidence that diversity in higher 
education benefits both non-minority and minority students.90 
Specifically, it identifies three ways that students benefit from learning in 
a diverse learning environment. First, "[s]tudents learn more and think 
in deeper, more complex ways in a diverse educational environment."91 
Second, the study shows that "[s]tudents educated in diverse settings are 
more motivated and betler able to participate in an increasingly 
heterogeneous and complex democracy."92 Third, "patterns of racial 
segregation and separation historically rooted in our national life can be 
broken by diversity experiences in higher education."93 
84. !d. 
85. Bok, supra n. 79 at 118-92. 
86. Jd.at193-217. 
87. Killenbeck, supra n. 76 at 1327; See Patricia Gurin, Expert Report of Patricia Gurin 
<http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/expert/gurintoc> (last updated Sept. 4, 2003). 
88. Killen beck, supra n. 76 at 1327. 
89. Gurin, supra n. 87 at <http://www.umich.edu/-urcl/admissions/lcgal/expcrt/info. html>. 
90. Gurin, supra n. 87 at <http://www.umich.edu/-urcl/admissions/lcgal/expcrt/summ. html>. 
91. Jd. 
92. Jd. 
93. !d. 
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C. The Orfield and Whitla Study94 
The third study, compiled by Gary Orfield and Dean Whitla, 
analyzed "a narrower and potentially more significant question, the effect 
of a diverse learning environment on students enrolled in what the study 
aptly characterizes as 'leading law schools."'95 This study is significant in 
that it attempts to provide empirical evidence to support Justice Powell's 
opinion in Bakke that diversity is a compelling government interest and, 
therefore, a justification for race-conscious admission policies.96 
By means of a Gallup Poll administered at Harvard and Michigan 
Law Schools, the study considered the impact of diversity by asking law 
students how it has influenced their educational experiences.97 The 
findings include the following: First, "large majorities have experienced 
powerful educational experiences from interaction with students of other 
races."9x Second, "[w]hite students appear to have a particularly 
enriching experience, since they are by far the most likely to have grown 
up with little interracial contact."99 Ultimately, this study provides strong 
evidence for the conclusion that "[t]he values affirmed by Justice 
Powell ... in the Bakke decision appear to be operating in the lives of law 
students today" because "most of today's students find [diversity] so 
beneficial to their legal education and to understanding critical 
dimensions of their profession. "100 
The empirical evidence generated by the aforementioned studies is of 
paramount importance because it supports a conclusion that diversity, 
achieved through race-conscious admissions programs, benefits both 
minority and non-minority students. These findings support the 
retention of admissions programs that increase diversity on university 
campuses because abandonment of such policies would harm not only 
those minority students who would otherwise be denied admission if race 
conscious admissions policies were eliminated, but also, as these studies 
demonstrate, the non-minority students who would take their places. 
94. Killenbeck, supra n. 76 at 1329 (citing Gary Orfield & Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal 
Education: Student Experiences in Leading Law Schools <http:/ /www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights/ 
publications/lawsurvey.html> ). The Orfield and Whitla Study has been moved to <http:/ I 
www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/lawmichigan/DiversityandLegalEducation.pdf> (last updated 
Aug. 1999). 
95. Killen beck, supra n. 76 at 1329. 
96. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12. 
97. Killen beck, supra n. 76 at 1331 (citing Orfield, supra n. 94 at 143). 
98. Orfield, supra n. 94 at 172. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
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IV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ALTERNATIVES 
Because the use of affirmative action programs in university 
admissions is still required to satisfy a strict scrutiny standard and, in 
some cases, may not survive such scrutiny, this section analyzes two 
affirmative action alternatives. 
A. Do Nothing 
Proponents of the "do nothing" alternative maintain "that blacks 
should, metaphorically, pull up their socks and get about the business of 
doing as well as whites do on tests." 101 This argument is based on the 
premise that the challenge of having no preferential treatment will 
inspire minority students to score better on admissions test. This 
argument is countered by Dr. Stephen Raudenbush, an expert quoted in 
Justice O'Connor's Grutter opinion, who testified that: 
[A] race-blind admissions system would have a 'very dramatic,' 
negative effect on the underrepresented minority admissions .... [I]n 
2000, 35 percent of underrepresented minority applicants were 
admitted . . . if race were not considered, only 10 percent of those 
applicants would have been admitted.... Under this scenario, 
underrepresented minority students would have comprised 4 percent of 
the entering class in 2000 instead of the actual figure of 14.5 percent. 102 
B. Statutory Alternatives to Affirmative Action Programs 
in University Admissions 
Texas recently elected to ban affirmative action policies that the Fifth 
Circuit found unconstitutional in H opwood. 103 The state enacted two 
alternative programs in an effort to retain diversity in its institutions of 
higher education. The first Texas statute, titled "Automatic Admission: 
All Institutions," provides that "each institution in the [state's] higher 
education system 'shall admit an applicant . . . as an undergraduate 
student if the applicant graduated with a grade point average (GPA) in 
the top 10% of the student's high school graduating class in one of the 
two school years' preceding the year for which the applicant is applying 
for admission."104 The second statute, titled "Other Admissions," 
provides for applicants who are not in the top 10% of their high school 
101. See jack Greenberg, Ajjirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the Condition 
and Theory, 43 Il.C:. L. Rev. 521,547 (May 2002). 
102. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2334 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
!03. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 932. 
104. c;reenberg, supra n. 101 at 538 (qtwtingTex. Educ. Code Ann.§ 51.803(a) (2002)). 
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class by stating that '"[b ]ecause of changing demographic trends, 
diversity, and population increases in the state,' in addition to academic 
achievement, schools 'shall also consider' any or a combination of 
'socioeconomic' factors." 105 As a result of these two "alternative-to-
affirmative-action" statutes, the University of Texas was able to restore its 
undergraduate black admission numbers to pre-Hopwood levels. 106 
However, it should be noted that the automatic admissions programs 
described above cannot work for professional programs and, 
consequently, the University of Texas law school's minority enrollment is 
well below pre-Hopwood levels. 107 
California also banned the use of affirmative action programs in 
university admissions. 108 In an attempt to preserve diversity in the state's 
institutions of higher education, California enacted a top percentage plan 
similar to the one adopted in Texas, but capped it at 4 percent as opposed 
to Texas' 10 percent. The California statute has produced dismal results. 
"Overall, in 2000 and 2001, the number of black students enrolling for 
the first time at the university's undergraduate colleges stabilized at about 
20% below the level at which it had been under affirmative action." 109 
The state has yet to remedy this problem. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For decades Federal circuit courts have grappled over the 
constitutionality of affirmative action programs in university admissions. 
Then, in Grutter and Gratz, the U.S. Supreme Court implicitly gave more 
power to Justice Powell's "diversity rationale." As a result, affirmative 
action supporters thought that the debate had been settled once and for 
all. However, critics allege that the U.S. Supreme Court did not resolve 
the issue and that it will continue to be fought out school by school and 
state by state. Consequently, this paper concludes that Justice Powell's 
diversity rationale satisfies the compelling governmental interest prong 
of the strict scrutiny test because empirical evidence shows that 
affirmative action programs benefit minority and non-minority students 
105. I d. at 539 (quoting Tex. Educ. Code Ann.§ 51.805(b) (2002) (the statute includes a list of 
18 factors that may be considered in the admission process)). 
106. Id. at 539. 
I 07. I d. at 540. 
108. Id. at 541. Proposition 209, which banned the use of affirmative action in university 
admissions, was enacted in 1996. Proposition 209 states: "The state shall not discriminate against, or 
grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or 
national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting." Cal. 
Con st. art. 1, § 31, cl. a. 
109. Greenberg, supra n. 101 at 541. 
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by creating a diverse learning environment where minority and non-
minority students come together to learn, exchange ideas, understand 
each other, and form opinions that they will carry with them after they 
leave college. Furthermore, this paper concludes that non-affirmative 
action alternatives should be considered if affirmative action programs 
are found to be unconstitutional and the compelling interest of a diverse 
student body is not satisfied. 
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